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Abstract
This paper investigates the changing nature of economic integration in China. Speci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cally, we consider business-cycle synchronization (correlation of demand and supply shocks)
among Chinese provinces during the period 1955-2011. We nd that the symmetry of sup-
ply shocks has declined after the liberalization initiated in 1978. In contrast, the correlation
of demand shocks has increased during the same period. We then seek to explain these
correlations by relating them to factors that proxy for interprovincial trade and vulner-
ability of regions to idiosyncratic shocks. Interprovincial trade and similarity in factor
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1 Introduction
Since 1978, China has been undertaking a gradual and largely steady liberalization. The
changes were especially profound in the economic sphere although, lately, they have extended
also to the political domain. The three decades of economic liberalization have had far-reaching
e¤ects on the Chinese economy and society. China has maintained a high rate of growth,
recently becoming the second largest economy in the world. Yet, the benets of this expansion
have not been universally shared. Most notably, the coastal provinces of Eastern and South-
Eastern China have charged ahead while the inland provinces have lagged behind. There is a
similar, though less pronounced, disparity between urban centers and their rural hinterlands
throughout China. These regional disparities reect not only di¤erentiated economic regional
development but are further reinforced by the continued implementation of the hukou system
of household registration which restricts labor and residential mobility.1
The large regional economic di¤erentials appear on the background of a high degree of eco-
nomic decentralization. This is highlighted by Xu (2010) who describes China as a regionally
decentralized authoritarian system. He points out that while the central government controls
the key political appointments at all levels, it allows regional governments to run their economic
a¤airs largely unimpeded. This, he argues, has emerged as a product of political upheavals
and purges during the Great Leap Forward and, especially, the Cultural Revolution. During
these turbulent periods, the Soviet-inspired centralized model was abandoned and instead the
regions were encouraged to compete with each other. The resulting inter-regional competition
was aimed primarily at maximizing output but it also fostered experimentation with respect
to production arrangements and policies. This decentralization continued and was even re-
inforced during the reform period. Arguably, a particularly dramatic step in this direction
was the creation of the special economic zones (SEZs) in the early years of liberalization.2
This e¤ectively introduced a two-speed system, allowing selected regions to charge ahead in
1More precisely, the hukou system divides the population into urban and rural residents, and restricts the
access of rural residents to public services including healthcare, education, pension insurance and unemployment
insurance in case they move to urban regions.
2On the history of SEZs and the role they have played in Chinese economic development, see Chen et al.
(2011), and the references therein.
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economic liberalization while the rest of the Chinese economy proceeded more cautiously. In
turn, this laid the foundations of the subsequent economic gaps between the coastal areas and
the rest of the country.3
In this paper, we document the depth of economic integration among Chinese provinces
and analyze the factors that foster such integration. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First,
we use a structural vector auto-regressive (SVAR) model to identify province-specic shocks
between 1955 and 2011.4 Our methodology allows us to distinguish between shocks that have
a temporary vs permanent e¤ect on output, typically referred to as demand and supply shocks,
respectively. We compute the correlations between these shocks for all pairs of provinces for
four sub-periods: two before and two after the 1978 liberalization. These correlations capture
the intensity of integration, and the changes therein, among Chinas provinces over a period
during which the country gradually abandoned central planning, state ownership as well as
Maoism. Second, we analyze the determinants of these correlations using a stylized version of
the gravity model (broadly in line with Artis and Okubo, 2010 and 2011, although they use
a di¤erent methodology for estimating business-cycle correlations). In particular, we seek to
explain the correlations of shocks by relating them to the factors that proxy for the vulnerability
of regions to idiosyncratic shocks, and the factors that can facilitate inter-regional transmission
of the e¤ects of such shocks. The latter include endowments of physical and human capital,
transport infrastructure, structure of the economic activity, openness to foreign trade, foreign
direct investment, geography, and economic policy. We also include variables that are likely
to be correlated with inter-provincial trade. This analysis is carried out for the same four
sub-periods so as to capture the determinants of economic integration in the various periods,
3An especially poignant example of the fruits of this policy is Shenzhen, a city in Guandong, whose population
exploded from around 300,000 to its current 14 million since it became the rst special economic zone more
than 30 years ago.
4The use of structural VARs to assess the intensity of economic integration between countries or regions was
pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) whose work was in turn motivated by the Theory of Optimum
Currency Areas (henceforth OCA; Mundell, 1961). Bayoumi and Eichengreen applied this methodology to
assess the merits of adopting the common currency in the European Union. They sought to identify which
European countries encounter shocks that are predominantly symmetric or asymmetric in nature, as the OCA
theory suggests that monetary integration is less costly if it involves countries that are subject to symmetric
shocks. Since their seminal contribution, this method has been used for assessing other countries or integration
projects as well, see Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003, 2006), de Haan et al. (2008a), and the references therein.
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and the changes therein.
Our main ndings are the following. First, the demand and supply shocks have evolved
di¤erently in the course of the Chinese reforms: demand shocks appear to have become more
synchronized over time while supply shocks have grown more dissimilar. Second, we nd that
factors that proxy for interprovincial trade and account for the similarity in factor endowments
tend to make shocks more symmetric. Rather surprisingly, foreign trade and inward FDI have
had little e¤ect on the symmetry of shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briey discusses what
we know about economic integration and decentralization in China. Section 3 describes the
data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the main empirical nding and Section 5
states the conclusions.
2 Chinas Economics Integration
2.1 Economic Decentralization under Mao and Deng
During the period from the communist takeover in 1949 until 1978, the Chinese economy was
tightly regulated: output quotas, resource allocations and prices were set centrally according to
a plan formulated by the central government. This reected the initial desire of Mao Zedongs
government to follow the Soviet model of organizing the economy. However, as argued by
Xu (2010), China started to deviate from the Soviet model during the economic and political
upheavals of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Rather
than plan and regulate the economic activity from the center, the central government granted
wide-ranging economic autonomy to the provincial governments. This was to encourage the
regions to compete with each other in order to deliver or exceed their quota of output. As a
result, China became a collection of regional economies rather than a single centrally-planned
Soviet-type economy, with the central government in Beijing retaining control over political
appointments and decisions while devolving much of economic policy making to the provinces.
The decentralization accelerated further after Maos death in 1976.5 The objective was
5For example, the central governments share of expenditures declined from 51 percent in 1978 to 28 percent
in 1993 (Ma and Norregaard, 1998).
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to reinvigorate the stagnant economy by improving incentives and encouraging local initiative
in the production (Tang, 1998). The scal and economic decentralization has been widely
acknowledged as one of the key drivers of the fast growth of the Chinese economy in the last
three decades. However, it has also allowed some locals governments to implement protectionist
policies, ostensibly with the objective to develop their local economies (Bai, 1981).
Another important change that took place after Maos death was the liberalization of the
economy. This was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and was designed to be gradual not
only with respect to time but also in space. Initially, the liberalization favored the coastal
regions and fostered their development ahead of the rest of the country. Most notably, the
central government directed foreign investment to a handful of SEZs, all of which were located
on the cost. In e¤ect, the SEZs were allowed to be increasingly driven by market forces while
central planning remained in force in the rest of the country. After the SEZs proved successful,
liberal policies were gradually extended beyond them, rst throughout the coastal provinces
and later throughout all of China. This helped stimulate the rapid development of the coastal
regions and increased their competitiveness compared to the interior (Poncet, 2005). At the
same time, the inland provinces continued to export raw materials to the coastal areas at xed
(low) prices, which translated to a net transfer of resources from the interior regions to the
manufacturing provinces on the coast. The less developed regions responded by pursuing a
policy of industrialization through import substitution, as decentralization combined with the
fact that most of tax revenue accrued from industrial production made them keen to develop
their industrial base (Lee, 1998; Poncet, 2005).
An important element of the Maoist regime was the household registration (hukou) system,
which severely restricts the ability of Chinese citizens to move and even travel within China.
Under this system, each person was tied to a particular area and could move to a di¤erent
area only with the permission of the authorities of both origin and destination regions. Despite
progressively accelerating economic liberalization, the hukou system has remained in place even
after 1978. Unlike during the Maoist period, rural workers now can move to and take up jobs
in the urban areas. However, changing their hukou to the destination region remains di¢ cult.
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This means that they can only receive public services in their region of origin: health care
eligibility, childrens education and pension claims, most notably, are not portable. Despite
this, labor mobility has been steadily increasing, especially from the inland rural to coastal
urban regions (Tang, 1998).
In all, China is an economy with a single currency but capital or labor are not perfectly
mobile. Its provinces are subject to centralized political rule but are growing more and more
decentralized on the economic front.
2.2 Asymmetric Shocks in China
How well integrated is the Chinese economy? A common approach for assessing the intensity
of integration is based on examining the similarity of business cycles. Compared with other
approaches, the business-cycle approach has several advantages. It not only provides a com-
prehensive measure of the various factors that contribute to economic integration but it can
reveal also whether there are any regional groups of the provincial economies that are highly
integrated (Tang, 1998).
A number of approaches have been utilized to assess the degree of asymmetry of shocks
across economies. When analyzing the integration of the Chinese economy, methodological
approaches initially developed in the international context are often applied in inter-regional
context as well.6 One method is based on considering correlations of growth rates, ination
rates, exchange rates, interest rates and/or stock prices. The weakness of this method is that
it does not allow one to distinguish between the shocks themselves and the reactions to them.
For example, Poncet and Barthélemy (2008) investigate business cycles and their determinants
by identifying the cyclical component of monthly provincial gross output over 1991-2004. They
nd that despite a cleavage existing between the coastal and interior regions, business-cycle
synchronization increased from a rather low level at the beginning of the 1990s to a level
comparable to that of the US at the beginning of the 2000s. Furthermore, they argue that
international trade and local economic policy foster synchronization. However, Herrmann-
6Since the international and intra-national contexts are fundamentally di¤erent, although we follow this
approach as well, we cannot draw direct comparisons between results that we obtain in inter-regional analysis
of China with those obtained with international data. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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Pillath, Libman and Yu (2010) argue that this nding may be attributable to the specic
macroeconomic environment during the period analyzed and as such it cannot be generalized
into the future.
Another popular method is to identify shocks using the SVAR model, as put forward by
Blachard and Quah (1989). This model allows the analyst to identify both shocks and the
economic responses to them. This method has became a popular tool for identifying asymmet-
ric shocks since it was applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) to assess the similarities
of economic cycles in Europe in the run-up to the formation of the European Economic and
Monetary Union (Babetskii, 2005). The SVAR methodology allows one to distinguish between
shocks that a¤ect both output and price level permanently (supply shocks) and those a¤ecting
output only temporarily while having a permanent price-level e¤ect (demand shocks). The
literature studying the business-cycle synchronization of the Chinese economy using the SVAR
method remains very limited, however. Tang (1998) adopts this model to gauge the degree of
economic integration within China using data on industrial output and the retail price index.
He argues that a high degree of integration prevails in Eastern China only. This nding has
been also replicated by Poncet and Barthélemy (2008).
Gerlach-Kristen (2009) uses a di¤erent methodology: she identies the common component
in output gap uctuations at the provincial level by using principal component analysis. She
nds that the degree of synchronization varies over time: while it was high during the 1960s,
it declined during the 1970s and 1980s and then rose again. Her results indicate, furthermore,
that business cycles in the inland provinces in Northern and Northeastern China tend to be
less inuenced by the national business cycle.
In summary, the evidence so far, as limited as it is, suggest that the Chinese provincial
business cycles have become more synchronized over time but this process has not been uniform.
In particular, a gap may be emerging between the coastal and interior regions, with the former
becoming more integrated over time, unlike the latter.
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2.3 Determinants of Business-cycle Co-movements
There is no consensus as to which determinants of business-cycle co-movement are important.
There are instead many potential candidate explanations of business-cycle synchronization or
the lack thereof. One leading candidate is trade. Frankel and Rose (1998) show empirically
that higher bilateral trade between two countries leads to greater correlation of business cycles
between them. An opposite view is put forward by Krugman (1993) who argues that inter-
national trade increases specialization, making shocks more asymmetric. Frankel and Rose
(1998) argue that inter-industry and intra-industry trade play di¤erent roles in this respect.
The former reects specialization and therefore may cause asymmetries. The latter implies
that the country simultaneously exports and imports products of the same category. The total
e¤ect of trade intensity on business-cycle correlation is therefore theoretically ambiguous and
the question can only be answered empirically. Fidrmuc (2004) adopts the approach of Frankel
and Rose (1998) and applies it to a cross section of OECD countries over the last ten years
with quarterly data, controlling for intra-industry trade in his analysis. His ndings conrm
the Frankel and Rose view. Baxter and Kouparitas (2005), similarly, argue that trade is the
only factor with a robust e¤ect on business cycle synchronization. In contrast, de Haan et al.
(2008b) posit that the role of trade is less important than suggested by this literature.
However, trade and business cycle correlation may be endogenous. Therefore, many studies
use instruments taken from gravity models to identify the relationship between business cycles
and trade. Alternatively, one can include the instruments directly in the regression equation.
The gravity model relates bilateral trade ows to variables such as distance between regions,
common language, common border, and so on. Therefore, gravity-model variables can be, in
turn, used as proxies for trade and therefore can be used as determinants of business-cycle
synchronization: see, among others, Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Calderon et al. (2007)
and Fidrmuc (2004).
Imbs (1998, 2003, 2004) and others point out the positive relationship between similarity
in the structure of output and business-cycle synchronization. The presence of this relation-
ship was conrmed in empirical analyses using regional data by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)
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and Clark and Wincoop (2001). Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001), in particular, nd that U.S.
states that are more specialized in turn display a lower correlation of business cycles with the
aggregate U.S. growth.
Fatás (1997) argues that the coordination of monetary and scal policies is a key deter-
minant of business-cycle synchronization. He points out that it has an ambiguous impact on
business cycles since it depends on the type of shocks driving economic uctuations and the
ability of governments to stabilize output. If macroeconomic policies are the source of business
cycles, more coordinated policy could lead to higher synchronization. Darvas et al. (2007) and
Artis et al. (2008) investigate and conrm this based on the European Union data while Pon-
cet and Barthélemy (2008) and Lan and Sylwester (2010) obtain similar ndings with Chinese
regional data.
Furthermore, factor endowments are also drew attention of scholars. Most theories, such
as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Ricardian theories and models with di¤erentiated products,
predict a signicant relationship among factor endowments and business-cycle co-movement.
3 Supply and Demand Shocks
3.1 Chinese Provincial Data
China is administratively divided into 31 regions: 22 provinces, 5 autonomous ethnic-minority
regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, Guanxi, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia)7 and 4 metropolitan provinces
(Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing). For simplicity, we refer to all of them as provinces
in the remainder of the paper. Our sample covers 28 provinces for which data are available.8
Annual data are available for the period from 1952 to 2011. Provincial real GDP growth and
the GDP deator are obtained from nominal and real GDP indexes published by the Bureau
7Autonomous regions are those with a high share of a particular ethnic minority: Tibetans (Tibet), Uyghurs
(Xinjiang), Zhuangs (Guangxi), Huis (Ningxia) and Mongols (Inner Mongolia). According to the Chinese
constitution, autonomous regions should enjoy more legal autonomy although this is hardly the case in practice.
8Tibet, Hainan and Chongqing are excluded due to missing data. In the cases of Hainan and Chongqing, this
is because these are new provinces, created recently by splitting away from Sichuan and Guangdong, respectively.
For the same reason, we are unable to use data on Sichuan before the forming of Chongqing as a separate entity.
Finally, we drop Tibet as almost no data is available on this province.
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of National Statistics of China.9 We test all variables for unit roots using the Augmented and
GLS Dickey-Fuller tests and obtain clear rejections of the null of unit root for rst di¤erences
of output and prices for all provinces.10
We subdivide the sample into three geographical regions: East, Center and West. Besides
reecting geography, this categorization also broadly captures the di¤erences in the degree
of economic development. During the early transition period, the coastal areas in the East
were the main beneciaries of the open door policy, developing much more quickly than the
interior areas in the Center and West. This regional break-down is conrmed by Herrerias
and Ordoñez (2012) who identify convergence clubs among Chinese provinces with respect to
income per capita, labor productivity and capital intensity: although their research yields ve
clubs, their borders approximately overlap with the three regions that we use. Furthermore, we
divide the period covered by the data into four sub-periods: 1955-1965, 1966-1977, 1978-1991
and 1992-2011. This break-down reects the main phases of Chinas economic and political
development. The rst two sub-periods correspond to the early and late Maoism. The early
Maoist period includes the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) while the late Maoist period
coincides with the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The economic liberalization was initiated
in 1978. It accelerated further following Deng Xiaopings Southern Tour in 1992. We therefore
treat this year as the start of a new phase of Chinas reform process (see also Fleisher et al.,
2009, and Xu, 2007).
3.2 Identication of Shocks
In this subsection, we present the methodology used to identify province-specic structural
shocks. We use a SVAR model with two variables: the log-di¤erence of output (annual real
GDP) and the log-di¤erences of prices (annual GDP deator), Y = (GDPt;Pt)0. It is
assumed that the uctuations in these two variables result from two types of disturbances:
supply and demand shocks. This terminology is motivated by the standard AS-AD analytical
framework. Supply shocks, which are associated with shifts of the long-run aggregate supply,
9We used the following publications: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China,
China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books.
10The test results are available upon request.
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lead to permanent changes in both real output and prices. Demand shocks have also short-term
e¤ects on both output and prices. However, since in the long-run the aggregate supply curve
is vertical, demand shocks do not have any long-term e¤ect on the level of output and become
fully absorbed by price-level adjustments.
Following Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), we estimate,
for each province, the following SVAR model involving real output growth and price-level
growth:
Yt = B1Yt 1 + B2Yt 1 + :::+ BkYt k + et (1)
where B are matrices of estimated coe¢ cients with k lags, and e = (eyt ; e
p
t )
0 are i:i:d: distur-
bances. This model can be represented by the following innite vector moving average (VMA)
process
Yt = et + B1et 1 + ::: =
1X
i=
CiL
iet (2)
The VAR disturbances are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, but they may and usually
are contemporaneously correlated. Therefore, we decompose them into structural shocks which
are orthogonal and which fulll the theoretical properties derived from the AS-AD model,11
Yt = A0"t + A1"t 1 + ::: =
1X
i=
AiL
i"t (3)
where " = ("D; "S)0 is a vector of demand and supply shocks, respectively. This implies that
unexplainable components of output growth and ination are driven by supply and demand
shocks. The vector of unobservable structural disturbances, ", can be obtained from equations
(2) and (3), which gives et = A0"t. Correspondingly, the variance-covariance matrix of VAR
residuals can be presented as e = A0"A 10 . Thus, the structural shocks can be derived from
the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, e, and the normalization of variance-covariance
matrix of structural shocks, ", to the identity matrix. Moreover, we impose the restriction
that demand shocks have no long-term impact on the level of output,
1P
i=0
ci;11"
D
t i = 0.
11Stazka (2006), among others, describes the Blanchard-Quah decomposition in more detail.
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3.3 Correlations of Supply and Demand Shocks
Having estimated the demand and supply shocks a¤ecting the individual provinces, we calculate
Sij and 
D
ij , the correlation of supply and demand shocks between any two provinces i and
j during sub-period  . If the correlation of shocks is positive, the shocks are considered
to be symmetric and if it is negative, they are asymmetric. Table 4 and Table 5 give the
weighted-average (with GDP used as weights) correlations of supply and demand shocks for
each province and for each sub-period. The tables also report the median gures for each
region and sub-period and for China as a whole.12 Figure 1 depicts the distribution of bilateral
cross correlations of supply shocks for the four sub-periods while Figure 2 provides the same
information for demand shocks. It is clear that the nature of shocks is changing over time.
However, the change is not the same for the two kinds of shocks. In particular, the correlations
of supply shocks display a lower degree of business-cycle synchronization during the more
recent periods. The China-wide median falls considerably, from 0.70 to 0.27 during the period
covered by our analysis. In contrast, the development of demand shocks suggest a greater
degree of synchronization in the later periods. The China-wide median correlation more than
quadruples, from 0.18 to 0.74. Rather remarkably, the China-wide pattern is mirrored also in
the change of the regional medians, both for supply and demand shocks, suggesting that this
divergent development of supply and demand shock is not limited only to a subset of provinces.
There are some outliers, such as the deeply-negative correlation of supply shocks for Liaoning
in the latest sub-period.13 Hence, depending on which type of shocks we look at, Chinese
provinces either appear to have become more closely integrated or have grown increasingly
apart since the reforms have been implemented.
12The provincial gures forming the regional medians are depicted by italics in the tables. Note that the
Central region has an even number of provinces so that two of them were used to compute the median value for
that region; both are in italics in the table while their average is reported as the median.
13There are several factors which can explain the result for this province. First, Liaoning used to be one of
the most heavily industrialized areas of China, with its economy following the Soviet model with an emphasis
on heavy industry. As such, it was heavily reliant on imports of resources at below-market prices from the other
provinces. The imports of cheap resources largely ceased during the reform period, which resulted in decline
of Liaonings economy at a time when other provinces were doing well. Second, Liaoning is at the border with
North Korea and the famine in that country (and the ensuing refugee inux) could have inuenced also the
economy of the Northeast region of China.
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The focus on the symmetry of shocks is at the core of the optimum currency area (OCA)
theory (Mundell, 1961). If shocks are su¢ ciently symmetric, the argument goes, the countries
or regions sharing the same currency will have little need for independent monetary policy.
With asymmetric shocks, policy preferences can diverge: a region hit by a negative shock
would prefer expansionary monetary policy while that a¤ected by a positive shock would be in
favor of a monetary tightening. The OCA theory, however, considers only the overall symmetry
of shocks, without dwelling on the distinction between demand and supply shocks. Therefore,
it gives us little guidance as to how to evaluate cases such as Chinas where falling correlation
of supply shocks seems counter-balanced by increasing symmetry of demand shocks.
Fidrmuc (2013), in contrast, presents a model of scal integration in which the di¤erence
between permanent and temporary output shocks plays an important role (recall that supply
shocks a¤ect output permanently while demand shocks only have a temporary e¤ect). He
argues that symmetry of permanent shocks is more important for the stability of integration
than symmetry of temporary shocks: both kinds of shocks give rise to divergent policy prefer-
ences but the impact of temporary shocks is (by denition) short lived while permanent shocks
can fundamentally undermine the stability of integration. In this context, the fact that China
is experiencing falling correlation of supply (permanent) shocks may come across as worry-
ing, despite the movement in the opposite direction by the correlation of demand (temporary)
shocks.
4 Determinants of Business Cycle Co-movement in China
4.1 Methodology
So far, we have explored the changing nature of business-cycle synchronization during the last
ve decades of Chinas history. In this section, we investigate the determinants of business cycle
co-movements and, thereby, shed some light on the factors behind the di¤erent developments
of supply and demand shocks discussed in the preceding section. Our approach is motivated
by Artis and Okubo (2010 and 2011) who were the rst to apply this kind of framework to
identify the determinants of business-cycle similarity in the inter-regional setting (the UK and
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Japan, respectively). While Artis and Okubo measured business-cycle synchronization using
HP ltered GDP correlations, we use the correlations of supply and demand shocks, discussed
in the preceding section, as the dependent variables. As Artis and Okubo, we analyze the
correlation coe¢ cients using a form of a gravity model, regressing them on the distance between
the two provinces and a number of provincial variables.
The correlations of supply and demand shocks, Sij and 
D
ij , estimated for provinces i and j
during sub-period  ; are dened between  1 and +1 whereas OLS assumes that the dependent
variables are unbounded. Therefore, besides using the original correlation coe¢ cients, we
follow Artis and Okubos approach by considering also the Fisher-z transformation of these
coe¢ cients. These are not bounded from above or below:
z =
1
2
log

1 + ij
1  ij

(4)
To explain the degree of shock synchronization between pairs of provinces, we introduce a
wide range of explanatory variables. As we highlight in the discussion of the determinants of
business-cycle co-movements, bilateral trade intensity is likely to increase the synchronization
of business cycles between provinces. Data on internal trade ows in any country, however, are
notoriously di¢ cult to obtain: unlike foreign trade, internal trade ows attract little o¢ cial
scrutiny and may be di¢ cult to measure (for instance, intra-rm deliveries crossing provincial
borders are unlikely to be included in o¢ cial statistics on interprovincial trade, even if such
statistics are collected). There is abundant evidence in the existing literature that the gravity
model explains bilateral trade very well (see, for example, Frankel and Rose, 1998, Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2006, and de Haan et al., 2008b). We therefore include the following commonly used
gravity variables: dummy for a common border (equal to 1 for adjacent provinces), same-region
dummy (equal to 1 when two provinces belong to the same region: East, Center and West),
coast and interior-coast dummies14 (equal to 1 when both provinces are located in the coastal
region and when one province is on the coast while the other lies in the interior, respectively),
14These two dummies should reveal up whether business cycles are more closely synchronized among coast
provinces (captured by the coast dummy), between coast and interior provinces (coast-interior dummy), or
among interior provinces (omitted category).
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bilateral distance (the shortest distance for freight transportation by railway in kilometers),
and economic size (measured as the sum of the two provincial GDPs, log Yi+log Yj).
Regions specializing in producing similar goods are likely to be exposed to similar shocks.
There is, however, no standard measure of similarity in the production structure. Following
Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Imbs (2004) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), we compute
Krugmans (1991) absolute value index. Let Sni and Snj denote the GDP shares for industry
n in provinces i and j. Then, the dissimilarity of the two provincesproduction structures is
measured as
1
N
NX
n=1
jSni   Snj j
To compute the index, we consider ve broad sectors of the Chinese economy: primary sector
(comprising agriculture, hunting, forestry, shing, and mining and quarrying); construction;
manufacturing; infrastructure services (transportation, post and telecommunications); and
trade services (wholesale, retail and catering).15
Another potential source of asymmetric shocks is represented by local policy making. Dis-
similarity of local policies is measured by means of two indicators. One captures the provincial
divergence of scal policy while the other investigates heterogeneity in terms of ination. Sim-
ilar to Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), we use the standard
deviation of provincial budget decit di¤erentials to measure the dissimilarity of scal pol-
icy (with annual budget decits expressed as a percentages of GDP). We capture provincial
divergence in ination as
1
T
TX
t=1
jGPIi;t  GPIj;tj
(see also Poncet and Barthélemy, 2008), where GPIi;t is the general price index of the province
i during the period t and T is the sub-period time span.
A major source of divergence of business cycles can be the exposure to foreign trade and
foreign direct investment. We measure the foreign trade dissimilarity as
1
T
TX
t=1
jTradei;t   Tradej;tj
15The data are taken from the Chinese national statistic year book.
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where Tradei;t correspond to the percentage share of foreign trade in GDP of province i during
period t and T is the sub-period time span. An analogous formula is used for FDI dissimilarity.
Finally, di¤erences in factor endowments can also play a role in explaining the degree of
business-cycle synchronization. We consider two factors of production: investments in human
capital and xed-assets. Investment in human capital is measured as secondary and higher
education enrolment rates (i.e. the ratio of the total secondary and higher education enrolment
to the population). Investment in physical capital is expressed as a percentage of GDP. For the
pre-1978 period, we only have public investment (private investment during this period is likely
to be very low or zero). After 1978, the data distinguish between total investment in physical
capital (including public investment) and public investment only. For the general regressions,
we include only total investment, whereas we use both types of investment in the univariate
regressions. Both investments (human and physical capital) are entered as dissimilarity indexes
computed in the same way as those for production structures, ination and trade discussed
above.
Thus, we estimate the following regressions for correlation of supply or demand shocks
between all Chinese provinces for the four sub-periods
k;fij = Xij
k;f + k;fij (5)
The dependent variable is either the correlation of supply and demand shocks (k = S;D)
or its Fisher z-transformation (denoted by superscript f = o; z, respectively). X is the vector
of explanatory variables discussed above and k;f is the coe¢ cient vector to be estimated.
All variables are taken as average values for the respective sub-period. We rst include all
variables in a multivariate regression. Alternatively, we consider separate relationships between
correlation of shocks and the various potential determinants, one explanatory variable at a time.
The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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4.2 Empirical Results
Tables 6 to 9 present the general regression results (with all variables) for each sub-period,
for the correlations of shocks and their Fisher-z transformations. The main nding concerning
supply shocks during the Maoist period (Table 6) is that hardly any of the variables explain
the interprovincial correlations of supply shocks in China. The overall explanatory power of
the regressions estimated for this period is extremely low: the joint F -test is only signicant
for the second regression (with Fisher z-transformation for 1955-65). The only gravity variable
that appears to play any role is the dummy for coastal regions in 1955-65 and its sign goes
against our expectations: provinces located along the coast display lower symmetry of shocks
then the rest. The dissimilarity in investment in physical capital lowers the correlation of
supply shocks, signicantly so during the early part of the Maoist period. Overall, economic
determinants seem to matter little for business cycle synchronization during the Maoist era.
The picture becomes clearer during the reform period (Table 7). Adjacent regions and
those located on the coast display higher correlations of supply shocks (however, the common-
border dummy is only signicant during the 1992-11 period). The dissimilarity in investment
in physical capital continues to lower the correlation of supply shocks during both sub-periods,
in line with expectations: regions with di¤erent patterns of investment have their business
cycles less synchronized.
The regressions results for the correlations of demand shocks are presented in Tables 8-
9. Again, essentially none of the included variables explain the similarity between provincial
shocks during the early Maoist period (and again, the explanatory variables are not jointly
signicant for this period ). During the later Maoist period, 1966-77, we see that the correlation
of shocks falls with distance. Much clearer picture again emerges during the reform period,
especially the early sub-period, 1978-91. The degree of correlation of demand shocks again
falls with distance (more so during the early reform period). Regions located on the coast tend
to encounter similar shocks during the early reform period. However, this is counterbalanced
by the negative coe¢ cient estimated for the same-region dummy during the same period. This
surprising result may reect a dichotomy between the regional centers and their surrounding
17
rural areas. Economic size appears to lower the symmetry of shocks during the early reform
period: two relatively large provinces would be expected to display a lower degree of symmetry
of demand shocks than two small provinces. Dissimilarity of investment in physical capital no
longer a¤ects synchronization of shocks, whereas dissimilarity in human capital appears to
lower synchronization of shocks during the late reform period, 1992-11.
Several variables are notable for being consistently insignicant: dissimilarity indexes with
respect to the output structures, exposure to trade and incoming FDI apparent to have no
impact on the symmetry of supply or demand shocks. This is somewhat surprising, especially
for trade and FDI, given the extraordinary importance of external economic relations for the
post-1978 economic development (Huang, 2011, for example, nds that exposure to FDI is an
important determinant of economic growth of Chinese regions). A possible explanation of this
absence is that the shocks attributable to foreign trade and FDI a¤ect most of China in much
the same way (or else that their e¤ects quickly spillover across regions).
Some of the variables included in the preceding regressions are likely to be collinear with
each other and this could explain their low signicance. Therefore, in Tables 10-13, we report
the results of univariate regressions between the correlations of supply and demand shocks,
respectively, and each variable considered. Few explanatory variables appear signicant dur-
ing the Maoist period again. Nevertheless, common border, distance and output size shape
the correlation of demand shocks during the late Maoist period: demand shocks become less
symmetric with distance while their similarity is higher for adjacent and for larger provinces.
Provinces sharing a common border, those located in the same region and those on the coast
also appear more similar during the reform period (though the coe¢ cients are not always sig-
nicant). The e¤ect of distance is similarly negative but it is not always signicant. Economic
size is not a signicant determinant of supply shocks whereas it appears negatively related to
the correlation of demand shocks during the reform period.
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5 Conclusion
The Chinese society has experienced numerous dramatic changes during the last ve decades:
the communist take-over, the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution,
and nally economic liberalization and opening up to the outside world and the rapid growth
that this has generated. In this paper, we document the impact of these changes on the
Chinese regional economies and on the degree of economic integration among them. The
picture that our results paint is mixed: as the reforms progress, Chinese provinces encounter
increasingly symmetric demand shocks but also increasingly asymmetric supply shocks. This is
potentially worrying: supply shocks lead to permanent economic di¤erentials, unlike demand
shocks, and therefore their falling similarity may undermine the stability of Chinese economic
integration in the future. This may translate into growing economic and political tensions
in the future, especially if appropriate adjustment channels are not introduced (for example,
greater liberalization of migration between provinces). The experience of countries such as
Belgium, Spain or Czechoslovakia demonstrates the dangers that growing economic divergence
can pose serious danger for political unity of countries, especially ethnically diverse ones.
We relate the interprovincial correlations of supply and demand shocks to a broad range of
economic variables but we again obtain at best mixed results. Little explains the synchroniza-
tion of business cycles during the Maoist period, especially during its early part, 1955-65. The
limited explanatory power of economic factors should perhaps not be surprising, given that
the Maoist period was dominated by politically-induced shocks of the Great Leap Forward
and Cultural Revolution. During the reform period, factors typically associated with bilateral
(interprovincial) trade matter, although their importance is not overwhelming. In particular,
we nd that the symmetry of both demand and supply shocks tends to fall with the distance
between provinces and rises when provinces share a border or are located in the same region.
We nd also that provinces that experience similar patterns of investment in physical capi-
tal tend to encounter similar supply shocks. In contrast, similarity in investment in physical
capital tends to make demand shocks less similar, possibly because investment behavior is
itself driven by demand shocks. Hence, interprovincial trade increases the symmetry of both
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demand and supply shocks while investment in physical capital has opposite e¤ects on supply
and demand shocks. Finally, and rather surprisingly, we nd little evidence that inward FDI
and foreign trade a¤ect the synchronization of demand or supply shocks, even though these
are among the main factors highlighted as drivers of the recent Chinese growth.
Clearly, our analysis fails to account for a number of factors that can also contribute to
the on-going divergence of permanent shocks in China. Chinese provinces may specialize in
a relatively narrow range of products but our data only distinguish very coarse categories of
output structure. Migration is an important channel mitigating asymmetric shocks but we do
not have any (reliable) data on this. Moreover, migration in China is still highly constrained by
the continued enforcement of the hukou system of household registration which limits mobility
of workers and their entitlement to public goods. Finally, the role of the special economic zones
deserves closer attention as the SEZs have e¤ectively enjoyed a substantial head start over the
rest of China. This, however, might require more disaggregate data than those that we have:
the SEZs typically account only for a relatively small portion of the province in which they
are located. Finally, the future will show whether supply shocks a¤ecting Chinese regions will
continue to diverge or whether this trend will be reversed.
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Figure 1: Interprovince correlation of supply shocks
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Notes: The horizontal axis shows correlation coe¢ cients while the vertical axix reports
the number of observations (province pairs) with that correlation.
Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
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Figure 2: Interprovince correlation of demand shocks
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Notes: The horizontal axis shows correlation coe¢ cients while the vertical axix reports
the number of observations (province pairs) with that correlation.
Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
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Table 1: Average provincial real GDP and growth rate, East
Provinces 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2011
Beijing
GDP
growth
36.93
6.53%
76.70
8.85%
238.30
9.22%
1432.51
11.07%
Tianjin
GDP
growth
27.02
6.58%
50.97
5.94%
139.74
8.47%
957.59
13.76%
Shanghai
GDP
growth
95.55
7.92%
199.93
7.27%
555.74
8.00%
3454.18
11.79%
Liaoning
GDP
growth
99.16
5.25%
176.40
7.55%
483.82
8.17%
2575.72
11.24%
Shandong
GDP
growth
61.41
3.56%
125.05
7.84%
416.32
10.29%
3550.36
13.28%
Jiangsu
GDP
growth
59.28
4.38%
109.52
4.01%
394.49
9.28%
3623.28
12.24%
Zhejiang
GDP
growth
39.20
5.22%
63.69
4.68%
256.24
12.84%
2356.09
13.25%
Fujian
GDP
growth
23.09
5.64%
36.36
4.93%
131.56
12.13%
1293.00
13.79%
Guangdong
GDP
growth
47.08
4.65%
79.52
4.93%
269.66
12.20%
2769.64
13.25%
GDP is average provincial GDP over the period in 100 million Yuan.
Sources: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China,
China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books
Table 2: Average provincial real GDP and growth rate, Center
Provinces 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2011
Hebei
GDP
growth
54.21
3.22%
99.76
7.95%
308.50
9.07%
2198.00
12.15%
Shanxi
GDP
growth
32.87
6.19%
50.39
4.31%
139.63
8.58%
726.65
10.95%
Inner-Mongolia
GDP
growth
26.49
5.96%
39.23
3.96%
111.49
9.48%
810.98
13.73%
Jilin
GDP
growth
29.04
5.94%
49.16
4.70%
133.00
8.98%
787.42
11.96%
Heilongjiang
GDP
growth
49.40
6.24%
89.47
5.40%
203.39
7.11%
902.02
10.11%
Anhui
GDP
growth
28.77
3.04%
45.34
4.43%
111.86
7.86%
729.74
12.77%
Jiangxi
GDP
growth
26.36
4.38%
41.23
4.01%
107.76
9.28%
712.47
12.24%
Henan
GDP
growth
42.33
1.67%
76.36
6.10%
231.06
9.88%
1513.67
12.08%
Hunan
GDP
growth
42.93
4.36%
71.90
5.82%
188.23
8.33%
1030.73
11.49%
Hubei
GDP
growth
41.81
7.21%
64.54
4.57%
196.95
9.53%
1265.32
12.31%
GDP is average provincial GDP over the period in 100 million Yuan.
Sources: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China,
China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books
Table 3: Average provincial real GDP and growth rate, West
Provinces 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2011
Guangxi
GDP
growth
23.48
5.36%
43.24
6.61%
112.73
7.84%
681.26
11.93%
Sichuan
GDP
growth
-
-
-
-
223.28
7.85%
1236.55
11.89%
Guizhou
GDP
growth
14.89
3.27%
18.91
3.86%
61.93
10.19%
292.73
10.19%
Yunnan
GDP
growth
21.93
4.81%
35.26
4.11%
104.66
10.33%
539.47
10.15%
Shaanxi
GDP
growth
24.81
5.12%
46.63
6.19%
137.51
9.48%
763.34
11.26%
Gansu
GDP
growth
19.26
3.76%
37.21
6.84%
101.80
8.44%
540.26
10.45%
Ningxia
GDP
growth
4.12
8.61%
10.35
8.44%
30.60
8.89%
154.32
10.57%
Qinghai
GDP
growth
4.41
7.83%
8.31
7.19%
20.88
6.93%
94.56
10.72%
Xinjiang
GDP
growth
16.92
8.09%
24.46
3.11%
77.54
10.99%
428.61
9.88%
GDP is average provincial GDP over the period in 100 million Yuan.
Sources: Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New China,
China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical books
Table 4: Weighted-average correlation of supply shocks by province
Region Province name 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2011
Beijing 0.61 0.56 0.42 0.28
Tianjin 0.78 0.38 0.44 0.23
EAST Shanghai 0.68 0.35 0.50 0.34
Liaoning 0.78 0.32 0.41 -0.29
Shandong 0.63 0.39 0.47 0.27
Jiangsu 0.39 0.54 0.38 0.27
Zhejiang 0.69 0.11 0.54 0.37
Fujian 0.70 0.36 0.49 0.38
Guangdong 0.66 0.35 0.38 0.41
Median East 0.68 0.36 0.44 0.28
Hebei 0.71 0.44 0.51 0.30
Shanxi 0.78 0.51 0.25 0.10
CENTRAL Inner-Mongolia 0.64 0.49 0.23 0.08
Jilin 0.74 0.50 0.35 0.29
Heilongjiang 0.78 0.41 0.38 -0.04
Anhui 0.47 -0.08 -0.21 0.06
Jiangxi 0.43 0.46 0.39 0.35
Henan 0.72 0.36 0.20 -0.09
Hunan 0.78 0.53 0.38 0.34
Hubei 0.72 0.50 0.37 0.24
Median Center 0.72 0.48 0.36 0.17
Guangxi 0.76 0.25 0.40 0.44
Sichuan - - 0.47 0.27
Guizhou 0.82 0.36 0.29 0.02
WEST Yunnan 0.62 0.40 0.39 0.24
Shaanxi 0.78 0.38 0.43 -0.06
Gansu 0.61 0.20 0.35 0.22
Ningxia 0.58 0.32 0.31 -0.17
Qinghai 0.70 0.24 0.39 0.16
Xinjiang 0.59 0.52 0.28 0.27
Median West 0.70 0.36 0.39 0.22
Median China 0.70 0.39 0.39 0.27
Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
Table 5: Weighted-average correlation of demand shocks by province
Region Province name 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2011
Beijing 0.02 0.04 0.44 0.66
Tianjin 0.25 0.20 0.49 0.76
EAST Shanghai 0.20 0.15 0.34 0.75
Liaoning -0.18 0.18 0.19 0.59
Shandong 0.24 0.08 0.20 0.63
Jiangsu -0.07 0.18 0.38 0.80
Zhejiang 0.28 0.07 0.42 0.78
Fujian 0.19 -0.13 0.48 0.73
Guangdong 0.20 0.09 0.37 0.73
Median East 0.20 0.09 0.38 0.73
Hebei 0.18 0.08 0.50 0.77
Shanxi 0.06 0.20 0.40 0.73
CENTRAL Inner-Mongolia 0.07 -0.02 0.44 0.77
Jilin 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.66
Heilongjiang 0.13 0.29 0.23 0.81
Anhui -0.18 0.28 0.40 0.70
Jiangxi 0.22 0.15 0.46 0.74
Henan -0.05 0.28 0.38 0.77
Hunan 0.22 -0.18 0.38 0.81
Hubei 0.10 0.10 0.39 0.78
Median Center 0.12 0.13 0.40 0.77
Guangxi 0.15 0.01 0.53 0.76
Sichuan - - 0.32 0.73
Guizhou 0.25 0.16 0.53 0.76
WEST Yunnan 0.20 -0.19 0.30 0.69
Shaanxi 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.74
Gansu 0.18 -0.22 0.21 0.51
Ningxia 0.19 -0.04 0.48 0.77
Qinghai 0.15 -0.11 0.40 0.77
Xinjiang -0.06 -0.15 0.39 0.70
Median West 0.18 -0.04 0.39 0.74
Median China 0.18 0.09 0.39 0.74
Source: Own calculations (see text for details).
Table 6: Determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, Maoist period
1955-65 1966-77
o z o z
common-border dummy
0:044
(0:042)
0:077
(0:089)
0:009
(0:063)
0:017
(0:082)
coast dummy
 0:107
(0:047)
 0:228
(0:092)
 0:060
(0:064)
 0:094
(0:082)
same-region dummy
0:044
(0:032)
0:073
(0:066)
0:067
(0:050)
0:109
(0:066)
coast-interior dummy
 0:030
(0:067)
 0:087
(0:130)
0:054
(0:096)
0:063
(0:122)
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km]
0:020
(0:011)
0:026
(0:022)
0:008
(0:019)
0:016
(0:023)
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ]
0:013
(0:039)
0:025
(0:074)
0:001
(0:048)
0:023
(0:061)
dissimilarity of physical capital
 0:529
(0:244)
 1:024
(0:450)
 0:130
(0:341)
 0:030
(0:423)
dissimilarity of human capital
0:025
(0:006)
0:041
(0:011)
0:024
(0:012)
0:022
(0:015)
dissimilarity of ination
 0:001
(0:001)
 0:002
(0:002)
 0:003
(0:003)
 0:003
(0:003)
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials
0:496
(0:228)
1:080
(0:466)
 0:741
(0:548)
 1:298
(0:705)
constant
0:586
(0:136)
0:780
(0:256)
0:400
(0:201)
0:384
(0:254)
observations 325 325 324 324
R2 0:05 0:05 0:02 0:03
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 7: Determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, reform period
1978-91 1992-2011
o z o z
common-border dummy
0:031
(0:051)
0:046
(0:062)
0:202
(0:057)
0:241
(0:068)
coast dummy
0:178
(0:053)
0:224
(0:068)
0:235
(0:080)
0:306
(0:099)
same-region dummy
 0:021
(0:041)
 0:021
(0:048)
 0:005
(0:045)
 0:011
(0:053)
coast-interior dummy
0:017
(0:088)
 0:018
(0:110)
 0:202
(0:112)
 0:249
(0:134)
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km]
 0:023
(0:019)
 0:033
(0:022)
0:021
(0:025)
0:027
(0:029)
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ]
0:023
(0:035)
0:011
(0:044)
 0:037
(0:050)
 0:045
(0:059)
dissimilarity of physical capital
 1:693
(0:367)
 2:071
(0:441)
 1:191
(0:393)
 1:380
(0:452)
dissimilarity of human capital
5:501
(2:419)
6:002
(2:925)
 8:027
(3:863)
 8:739
(4:447)
dissimilarity of ination
0:016
(0:012)
0:019
(0:015)
0:063
(0:031)
0:074
(0:036)
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials
1:139
(0:548)
1:351
(0:662)
0:593
(0:909)
0:453
(1:058)
dissimilarity of trade
0:095
(0:165)
0:089
(0:197)
0:069
(0:067)
0:097
(0:078)
dissimilarity of FDI
 4:656
(3:788)
 5:242
(4:477)
 0:088
(0:107)
 0:122
(0:117)
dissimilarity of output structure
 0:163
(0:131)
 0:157
(0:153)
0:420
(0:270)
0:469
(0:320)
constant
0:277
(0:171)
0:393
(0:209)
0:310
(0:326)
0:369
(0:381)
observations 378 378 378 378
R2 0:13 0:13 0:11 0:12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 8: Determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, Maoist period
1955-65 1966-77
o z o z
common-border dummy
0:012
(0:080)
0:010
(0:091)
0:064
(0:066)
0:065
(0:075)
coast dummy
0:110
(0:095)
0:133
(0:112)
 0:062
(0:075)
 0:082
(0:083)
same-region dummy
 0:044
(0:061)
 0:052
(0:070)
0:007
(0:058)
0:014
(0:068)
coast-interior dummy
 0:018
(0:135)
 0:031
(0:158)
 0:185
(0:087)
 0:205
(0:094)
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km]
0:003
(0:026)
0:004
(0:030)
 0:092
(0:023)
 0:100
(0:028)
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ]
 0:135
(0:061)
 0:153
(0:070)
0:027
(0:066)
0:031
(0:078)
dissimilarity of physical capital
 0:569
(0:442)
 0:684
(0:514)
 0:667
(0:429)
 0:743
(0:507)
dissimilarity of human capital
 0:016
(0:025)
 0:019
(0:026)
0:057
(0:034)
0:062
(0:039)
dissimilarity of ination
 0:003
(0:002)
 0:004
(0:003)
 0:003
(0:003)
 0:003
(0:003)
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials
0:368
(0:349)
0:403
(0:404)
 0:087
(0:656)
 0:126
(0:739)
constant
0:568
(0:218)
0:652
(0:249)
0:194
(0:273)
0:215
(0:328)
observations 325 325 324 324
R2 0:02 0:02 0:13 0:12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 9: Determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, reform period
1978-91 1992-2011
o z o z
common-border dummy
 0:039
(0:050)
 0:040
(0:063)
 0:013
(0:023)
 0:033
(0:050)
coast dummy
0:152
(0:059)
0:192
(0:075)
 0:032
(0:031)
 0:058
(0:063)
same-region dummy
 0:096
(0:035)
 0:127
(0:043)
 0:010
(0:018)
 0:011
(0:039)
coast-interior dummy
0:037
(0:096)
0:070
(0:126)
 0:050
(0:033)
 0:115
(0:070)
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km]
 0:071
(0:019)
 0:098
(0:023)
 0:027
(0:008)
 0:058
(0:017)
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ]
 0:159
(0:037)
 0:200
(0:049)
 0:035
(0:017)
 0:074
(0:039)
dissimilarity of physical capital
0:525
(0:382)
0:637
(0:507)
0:058
(0:133)
0:080
(0:272)
dissimilarity of human capital
0:774
(2:406)
2:157
(3:033)
 3:117
(1:288)
 6:436
(2:655)
dissimilarity of ination
0:069
(0:010)
0:092
(0:015)
0:018
(0:009)
0:029
(0:021)
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials
 0:315
(0:559)
 0:353
(0:694)
 0:260
(0:318)
 0:305
(0:675)
dissimilarity of trade
 0:168
(0:185)
 0:176
(0:241)
0:010
(0:022)
0:012
(0:044)
dissimilarity of FDI
 2:197
(3:817)
 3:911
(4:985)
 0:051
(0:058)
 0:121
(0:124)
dissimilarity of output structure
 0:088
(0:119)
 0:145
(0:150)
 0:079
(0:087)
 0:261
(0:209)
constant
1:132
(0:176)
1:383
(0:231)
0:593
(0:153)
1:607
(0:251)
observations 378 378 378 378
R2 0:16 0:17 0:07 0:07
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 10: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, Maoist period
1955-1965 1966-1977
o z o z
common-border dummy 0:029
(0:032)
[0:003]
0:051
(0:063)
[0:002]
0:039
(0:044)
[0:002]
0:047
(0:056)
[0:002]
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] 0:004
(0:01)
[0:000]
 0:001
(0:022)
[0:000]
 0:006
(0:015)
[0:001]
 0:006
(0:019)
[0:000]
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ] 0:022
(0:026)
[0:002]
0:043
(0:052)
[0:002]
0:005
(0:036)
[0:000]
0:012
(0:046)
[0:000]
dissimilarity of capital investment  0:326
(0:170)
[0:011]
 0:599
(0:336)
[0:010]
 0:291
(0:238)
[0:005]
 0:358
(0:304)
[0:004]
dissimilarity of human capital 0:020
(0:017)
[0:004]
0:033
(0:034)
[0:003]
0:023
(0:047)
[0:001]
0:018
(0:060)
[0:000]
dissimilarity of ination  0:001
(0:002)
[0:001]
 0:002
(0:003)
[0:001]
 0:003
(0:002)
[0:005]
 0:003
(0:003)
[0:004]
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials 0:213
(0:188)
[0:004]
0:541
(0:371)
[0:007]
 0:695
(0:529)
[0:005]
 1:182
(0:674)
[0:009]
observations 325 325 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 11: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of supply shocks, reform period
1978-1991 1992-2011
o z o z
common-border dummy 0:022
(0:037)
[0:001]
0:045
(0:045)
[0:003]
0:125
(0:049)
[0:017]
0:144
(0:058)
[0:016]
same-region dummy 0:039
(0:029)
[0:005]
0:058
(0:036)
[0:007]
0:089
(0:039)
[0:013]
0:108
(0:046)
[0:015]
coast dummy 0:206
(0:046)
[0:051]
0:257
(0:056)
[0:054]
0:187
(0:062)
[0:024]
0:252
(0:073)
[0:031]
coast-interior dummy 0:033
(0:070)
[0:001]
0:052
(0:085)
[0:001]
 0:037
(0:094)
[0:000]
 0:052
(0:110)
[0:001]
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km]  0:022
(0:013)
[0:007]
 0:034
(0:016)
[0:010]
0:003
(0:018)
[0:000]
0:003
(0:021)
[0:000]
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ] 0:117
(0:030)
[0:038]
0:135
(0:037)
[0:035]
0:034
(0:035)
[0:002]
0:051
(0:041)
[0:004]
dissimilarity of capital investment  0:205
(0:240)
[0:002]
 0:223
(0:291)
[0:002]
 1:171
(0:371)
[0:026]
 1:383
(0:435)
[0:026]
dissimilarity of xed assets investment  1:725
(0:346)
[0:062]
 2:077
(0:419)
[0:061]
 0:737
(0:307)
[0:015]
 0:835
(0:360)
[0:014]
dissimilarity of human capital 0:512
(1:856)
[0:000]
 0:188
(2:249)
[0:000]
 9:083
(3:888)
[0:014]
 10:247
(4:563)
[0:013]
dissimilarity of ination 0:008
(0:012)
[0:001]
0:007
(0:015)
[0:001]
0:054
(0:028)
[0:010]
0:064
(0:033)
[0:010]
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials 0:542
(0:349)
[0:006]
0:680
(0:422)
[0:007]
 0:308
(0:779)
[0:000]
 0:590
(0:914)
[0:001]
dissimilarity of output structure 0:070
(0:076)
[0:002]
0:092
(0:092)
[0:003]
0:102
(0:208)
[0:001]
0:117
(0:244)
[0:001]
dissimilarity of FDI 2:207
(2:440)
[0:002]
2:465
(2:958)
[0:002]
 0:143
(0:199)
[0:001]
 0:164
(0:233)
[0:001]
dissimilarity of trade 0:167
(0:106)
[0:007]
0:190
(0:128)
[0:006]
0:031
(0:046)
[0:001]
 0:051
(0:054)
[0:002]
observations 378 378 378 378
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 12: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, Maoist period
1955-1965 1966-1977
o z o z
common-border dummy 0:011
(0:059)
[0:000]
0:007
(0:068)
[0:000]
0:159
(0:054)
[0:023]
0:171
(0:062)
[0:023]
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km] 0:001
(0:020)
[0:000]
0:002
(0:024)
[0:000]
 0:104
(0:018)
[0:094]
 0:114
(0:021)
[0:087]
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ]  0:051
(0:048)
[0:003]
 0:052
(0:056)
[0:003]
0:118
(0:044)
[0:022]
0:129
(0:050)
[0:020]
dissimilarity of capital investment  0:019
(0:315)
[0:000]
 0:060
(0:366)
[0:000]
 1:091
(0:292)
[0:042]
 1:215
(0:333)
[0:040]
dissimilarity of human capital  0:006
(0:032)
[0:000]
 0:008
(0:037)
[0:000]
0:063
(0:059)
[0:004]
 0:068
(0:067)
[0:003]
dissimilarity of ination  0:003
(0:003)
[0:003]
 0:003
(0:003)
[0:003]
 0:003
(0:003)
[0:003]
 0:003
(0:003)
[0:003]
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials 0:200
(0:347)
[0:001]
0:209
(0:404)
[0:001]
 0:750
(0:661)
[0:004]
 0:913
(0:754)
[0:005]
observations 325 325 325 325
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
Table 13: Univariate determinants of interprovince correlation of demand shocks, reform period
1978-1991 1992-2011
o z o z
common-border dummy 0:019
(0:037)
[0:00109]
0:041
(0:046)
[0:0021]
0:012
(0:017)
[0:001]
0:026
(0:035)
[0:001]
same-region dummy  0:022
(0:029)
[0:002]
 0:030
(0:037)
[0:008]
0:003
(0:013)
[0:000]
0:020
(0:028)
[0:001]
coast dummy  0:016
(0:046)
[0:000]
 0:023
(0:059)
[0:000]
 0:038
(0:021)
[0:009]
 0:068
(0:044)
[0:006]
coast-interior dummy 0:041
(0:069)
[0:001]
0:090
(0:087)
[0:003]
 0:026
(0:032)
[0:002]
 0:074
(0:066)
[0:003]
railway (freight) distance [in 1000s km]  0:022
(0:013)
[0:007]
 0:033
(0:017)
[0:010]
 0:016
(0:006)
[0:018]
 0:034
(0:013)
[0:019]
economic size [log Yi+log Yj ]  0:116
(0:030)
[0:039]
 0:143
(0:038)
[0:037]
 0:025
(0:012)
[0:012]
 0:057
(0:025)
[0:014]
dissimilarity of capital investment 0:328
(0:235)
[0:005]
0:335
(0:299)
[0:003]
 0:015
(0:128)
[0:000]
 0:142
(0:265)
[0:001]
dissimilarity of xed assets investment 0:721
(0:348)
[0:011]
0:862
(0:443)
[0:010]
0:027
(0:105)
[0:000]
 0:003
(0:218)
[0:000]
dissimilarity of human capital  0:958
(1:820)
[0:001]
 1:09
(2:32)
[0:001]
 2:108
(1:325)
[0:007]
 4:550
(2:750)
[0:007]
dissimilarity of ination 0:040
(0:012)
[0:029]
0:053
(0:015)
[0:032]
0:006
(0:010)
[0:001]
0:001
(0:020)
[0:000]
standard deviation of scal decit di¤erentials  0:694
(0:341)
[0:011]
 0:921
(0:434)
[0:012]
 0:151
(0:264)
[0:001]
 0:249
(0:549)
[0:001]
dissimilarity of output structure  0:150
(0:074)
[0:011]
 0:200
(0:094)
[0:012]
 0:065
(0:071)
[0:002]
 0:191
(0:146)
[0:005]
dissimilarity of FDI 0:257
(2:397)
[0:000]
0:288
(3:050)
[0:000]
 0:047
(0:068)
[0:001]
 0:134
(0:140)
[0:002]
dissimilarity of trade  0:151
(0:104)
[0:006]
 0:185
(0:132)
[0:005]
 0:013
(0:016)
[0:002]
 0:043
(0:033)
[0:005]
observations 378 378 378 378
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Dependent variable: original correlations (o)
and Fisher z-transformations (z). The common-border and same-region dummies denote provinces that share a border
and belong to the same region (East, Central or West), respectively. The coast and coast-interior dummies denote
provinces that are both on the coast and where one is on the coast and the other in the interior, respectively. Distance is
railway freight distance in kilometers. Economic size is the sum of the provincial GDPs in logs. Dissimilarity index of
variable X is dened as 1K
XK
n=1
jXin  Xjnj, where K counts the sectors/periods and X stands for physical
capital, human capital, ination, trade, FDI, or output structure. Source: Own calculations.
